Relier Pairs 1. The MarketVersion en ligne Intermediate Microeconomics 8th Edition: A Modern Approach par Shaner Adams 1 If our model of rent control allowed for unrestricted subletting, who would end up getting apartments in the inner circle? Would the outcome be Pareto efficient? 2 What do you suppose the effect of a tax would be on the number of apartments that would be built in the long run? 3 Suppose the demand curve is D(p) = 100 − 2p. What price would the monopolist set if he had 60 apartments? How many would he rent? What price would he set if he had 40 apartments? How many would he rent? 4 Suppose now that the condominium purchasers were all inner-ring people, but that each condominium was constructed from two apartments. What would happen to the price of apartments? 5 In the above example, what would the equilibrium price be if there were 24 apartments to rent? What if there were 26 apartments to rent? What if there were 25 apartments to rent? 6 If people have different reservation prices, why does the market demand curve slope down? 7 Suppose that there were 25 people who had a reservation price of $500, and the 26th person had a reservation price of $200. What would the demand curve look like? 8 In the text we assumed that the condominium purchasers came from the inner-ring people—people who were already renting apartments. What would happen to the price of inner-ring apartments if all of the condominium purchasers were outer-ring people—the people who were not currently renting apartments in the inner ring? A tax would undoubtedly reduce the number of apartments supplied in the long run. Because if we want to rent one more apartment, we have to offer a lower price. The number of people who have reservation prices greater than p must always increase as p decreases. The price of apartments in the inner ring would go up since demand for apartments would not change but supply would decrease. The price of apartments in the inner ring would rise. It would be constant at $500 for 25 apartments and then drop to $200 In the first case, $500, and in the second case, $200. In the third case, the equilibrium price would be any price between $200 and $500. Everyone who had a reservation price higher than the equilibrium price in the competitive market, so that the final outcome would be Pareto efficient. (Of course in the long run there would probably be fewer new apartments built, which would lead to another kind of inefficiency.) He would set a price of 25 and rent 50 apartments. In the second case he would rent all 40 apartments at the maximum price the market would bear. This would be given by the solution to D(p) = 100 − 2p = 40, which is p∗ = 30.
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